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Abstract: In light of the recent argument that rapid economic growth in Russia over the 
next decade might result in emissions higher than the Kyoto target, thereby putting much-
needed growth at risk, this paper revisits the discussion on the costs and benefits of 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia. The paper concludes that even under a very 
high economic growth assumption, and even under very conservative assumptions about 
the decoupling between CO2 emissions and economic growth, Russia still benefits from a 
net surplus of emissions allowances, and thus will not see its growth adversely affected 
by the Kyoto target. In addition, a review of the possible costs and benefits of the Kyoto 
Protocol suggests that the potential sale of excess allowances far outweighs the other 
costs. 
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Over the past 14 years, Russia has been undergoing a massive transformation from a 
planned to a market economy. The transition was particularly painful by any measure: 
domestic gross product contracted by 39%
1 between 1990 and 1999, unemployment 
increased 27-fold
2, and a staggering 23.8%
3of the population dropped below the $2 a day 
poverty line (World Bank, 2004, IMF, 2004). 
Since 1999, fueled by higher oil and gas exports, the Russian economy has started to 
move in the right direction again: the average growth rate has been 6.7% p.a. over the 
period 1999-2003. Yet Russia has barely recovered from the depression (its 2003 GDP 
has reached the level of 1992). As of 2003, 34 million people remained below the poverty 
line, and 1.6 million were unemployed (IMF, 2004).  
In this context, it is perfectly legitimate to ask whether Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol—which puts a cap on Russia’s emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) for the 
period 2008-2012—could endanger growth in the short- and medium-term, given the fact 
that GHG emissions and economic growth usually move in the same direction.  Is there a 
risk that business-as-usual emissions could exceed their 1990 target level in 2008-2012? 
And if that is the case, what would be the cost of meeting the target, and the impact on 
growth? 
A large literature has been devoted to the first question, and the vast majority of the 
analyses find that Russia will gain a net surplus of emissions allowances—the so-called 
“hot air”—in the range of 300 to 1,000 MtCO2 per year, on average, between 2008 and 
2012 (Haites 2004). Thus, according to these studies, Russia will not lose, but will in fact 
gain from the Kyoto Protocol by selling part of its excess allowances to Europe, Japan 
and Canada. In this context, the economics of ratification boils down to whether or not 
Kyoto entails other costs that might counterbalance these benefits. 
But the projection that the business-as-usual emissions of Russia will not exceed their 
target is not unanimously supported. An intriguing paper by the Russian Institute for 
Economic Analysis (IEAr,
4 2004) suggests that given the rigidities in the Russian 
economy, meeting President Putin’s target of doubling the GDP in 10 years would 
generate emissions higher than the target between 2008 and 2012; as a result, Kyoto 
would become a binding constraint on Russia’s economy. 
The IEAr study differs from the other studies in two important assumptions: (i) it 
postulates, amongst different options, the highest economic growth rate over the next 10 
years (7.2% against 2.9% - 5% in the other studies), (ii) it uses the “carbon intensity” of 
GDP as a key parameter and assumes that this parameter will decline at a slow rate of 
less than -2% p.a.  This last assumption is justified using a set of “comparators”.  The 
IEAr analysis raises questions as to whether the results from the previous studies are 
                                                 
1 Calculated using GDP in constant 1995 US$ 
2 1991-1999 
3 as of 2000 
4 We use the acronym IEAr for the Russian Institute for Economic Analysis to avoid any confusion with 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), whose work is also referenced in this paper.   3
robust to higher economic growth rates, and as to whether the “comparators” method is 
valid. 
The objective of the present paper is to review the debate on the costs and benefits of 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in light of the questions raised by the IEAr analysis. To 
do so, section 2 discusses whether Kyoto can constrain business-as-usual GHG emissions 
in Russia, even under the high economic growth rate scenario used in the IEAr study. 
Section 3 reviews the potential gains that Russia could get from selling excess 
allowances, and discusses whether hidden costs could offset them. Section 4 looks briefly 
beyond Kyoto, and section 5 concludes. 
2  Potential Costs to Russia Associated with Ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol  
2.1  Will Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol Constrain GDP Growth? 
The Kyoto Protocol imposes limits on the combined emissions of six gases—CO2, CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6—, the so-called “Kyoto gases”, over the period 2008-2012, or 
first commitment period, for developed countries and transition economies, the so-called 
“Annex B” countries. 
Russia is listed in the Annex B of the Protocol and, as such, is subject to a constraint on 
its GHG emissions for the period 2008-2012. The target for Russia is that its combined 
emissions of “Kyoto gases” should not exceed five times their combined 1990 levels 
during the period 2008-2012. This target is generally expressed in annual terms: on 
average, Russia’s annual emissions of the six Kyoto gases should not exceed, their 1990 
level—or 3,048 MtCO2e
5—over the period 2008-2012. 
To meet their respective targets, member of Annex B, including Russia, can both adopt 
domestic policies and measures to reduce their emissions, and use three “flexibility 
mechanisms”:  
•  Emissions trading, whereby an Annex B Party can purchase emissions allowances 
(or Assigned Amount Units, AAUs, in the Protocol’s jargon) from another Annex 
B Party (Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol). 
•  Joint Implementation (JI), whereby a Party of Annex B can participate in the 
financing of a project that reduces emissions in another Annex B country relative 
to what would have happened without the project, and use part of the emission 
reductions thus generated against its own target (Article 6). 
•  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is the same project-based 
mechanism as JI, but with the project located in a non-Annex B country. 
In theory, the Kyoto Protocol could affect GDP growth in Russia in two ways: Since 
GHG emissions are in general related to economic activity, the constraint that the Kyoto 
Protocol puts on emissions could translate into a constraint on economic growth, either 
                                                 
5 This is the official figure from Russia’s Third National Communication to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (Government of Russia, 2002). The common unit for measuring emissions of the Kyoto 
gases are metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e).   4
directly  because Russia has to reduce its emissions, or devote resources to purchase 
emissions allowances through any of the three flexibility mechanisms to meet its Kyoto 
target, or indirectly because of Kyoto’s impact on international energy markets and terms 
of trade. 
As of 1999—the last publicly-available estimate—Russia’s combined emissions of the 
six Kyoto gases were 1,877 MtCO2e, or 38.4% below 1990 levels (Government of 
Russia, 2002), because Russia’s GHG emissions declined sharply at the beginning of the 
1990s with the ensuing economic crisis. CO2 emissions in 2003—the largest component 
of GHG emissions—were still only 1,589 MtCO2e, or 32.7% below Russia’s 1990 
emissions of CO2 (InRU, 2004).
6 It is thus not clear a priori that the constraint on 
emissions generated by the Kyoto Protocol will be binding. This subject is discussed in 
detail in subsection 2.2. 
Even if the GHG emissions constraint is not binding, the Kyoto Protocol could have 
indirect  impacts on GDP growth in Russia via international markets for energy and 
carbon-intensive goods in general. For example, the Kyoto Protocol could reduce demand 
for oil and gas in Europe, Japan, and Canada, thereby reducing international prices, and 
affecting Russia’s balance of trade; and by extension economic growth. Since Russia is a 
major exporter of oil and gas, this is a potentially important issue, which is discussed 
briefly in subsection 2.3. 
2.2  Will There be a Direct Impact on GDP  Through Binding Emissions 
Constraints ? 
To determine whether the Kyoto constraint is binding, one needs to estimate what GHG 
emissions in Russia are likely to be in a “business-as-usual” scenario during the period 
2008-2012. Obviously, GHG emissions over the next decade will depend on the 
underlying growth in GDP. The paper thus asks, under which assumptions for GDP 
growth would Russian GHG emissions be at risk of exceeding the Kyoto target? Since 
GHG emissions and GDP are in general positively correlated, the paper is particularly 
concerned with the high GDP growth rates scenarios. 
This section first focuses on the link between GDP and CO2 emissions. There are three 
reasons for that. (i) CO2 is by far the most important gas in Russia’s GHG emissions 
(CO2 represented 80.4% of the combined emissions of “Kyoto gases” in 1999). (ii) CO2 
emissions data is available up to 2003. And (iii) CO2 emissions originate mostly from the 
combustion of fossil-fuels to produce energy and heat (e.g., in coal- or gas-fired power 
plants or in trucks and cars). Since energy is a key production factor for industry, as well 
as a key service for households, studying the link between GDP and CO2 emissions 
makes a lot of sense. 
Subsection 2.2.1 first reviews the econometric approach using aggregate data to analyze 
the link between GDP and CO2 emissions. It discusses, in particular, the econometric 
arguments underlying the IEAr (2004) finding that there will be only a slow decoupling 
between CO2 emissions and GDP in the coming decade. In 2.2.2, the paper reviews 
                                                 
6 Institute of Energy Research (InRU) data are consistent with Gov. of Russia data for the period the series 
overlap.   5
arguments based on less aggregated data that suggest the link between CO2 emissions and 
GDP is less rigid than the IEAr assumes. On this basis, subsection 2.2.3 finds that the 
Kyoto constraint is unlikely to be binding even for GDP growth rates corresponding to a 
doubling of GDP in 10 years (7.2% p.a.). Lastly, subsection 2.2.4 shows that this 
conclusion remains valid even when emissions from land use, land-use change and 
forestry are taken into account. 
2.2.1  Using an Econometric Approach to Estimate the Link Between CO2 
Emissions and GDP with Aggregate Data 
Using cross-country panel data, several studies (e.g.., Heil and Selden, 2001, Ravallion et 
al., 2000) find a robust relationship between the level of GDP per capita and the level of 
CO2 emissions in the form of an inverse U-shaped curve. However, the robustness of this 
relationship at country level is controversial. For example, Moomaw and Unruh (1997) 
claim that observed peaks in emissions as GDP per capita increases are better explained 
by the two oil prices shocks than by increases in GDP per capita. This in turn casts doubt 
on the validity of the assumption that there is a “common development path” that all 
countries would follow, an assumption that is, however, necessary to use the U-shaped 
relationship between level of GDP per capita and level of CO2 emissions to project 
country-level emissions in the future (Heil and Segden, 2001).  Instead, the focus should 
be on analyzing country-specific trends and parameters.   
Cross-country panel data have also been used to estimate the relationship between the 
rate of growth of per capita GDP and the rate of growth of CO2 emissions. But no stable 
relationship emerges (e.g., Grubb, 2004). 
The IEAr study (2004) sharply differs from the studies mentioned above. First, it focuses 
on the relationship between GDP per capita and the carbon intensity of GDP—that is the 
amount of carbon emitted per unit of GDP—rather than the elasticity of carbon emissions 
with respect to GDP. Second, it finds enough econometric evidence in past emissions 
trends to project that “the highest possible rates of decline in the carbon intensity of 
Russia’s GDP [in the coming decade] are estimated at below 2.0 per cent per year.” If 
that statement is true, it would significantly increase the likelihood that the Kyoto 
constraint becomes binding. It thus warrants careful examination.  
i) Principle Arguments and Conclusions in the IEAr Study  
To support its claim, the study offers four arguments based on past data—the first three 
are relationships between levels of GDP per capita and variations in carbon intensity, and 
the last is a relationship between the growth rate of GDP and the rate of change in carbon 
intensity: 
a) The rapid decline in carbon intensity of GDP observed in Russia from 1998 to 2003 is 
an anomaly stemming in large part from favorable terms of trade. To project 
accurately over the next decade, one should either consider a longer period in the 
past (i.e. 1990-2003), or deduct terms of trade gains. 
b) Countries that are better comparators for Russia have experienced lower rates of 
decline of carbon intensity of GDP in the past one to two decades. 
c) Industrialized countries experienced low rates of decline of carbon intensity of GDP 
when their development in the past was comparable to Russia’s today.   6
d) High GDP growth rates are not correlated with high rates of decline in carbon intensity 
per unit of GDP. In fact, there are reasons to believe that high growth rates are 
correlated with low rates of decline. 
In what follows, each of these arguments is analyzed in turn. 
ii) Principle Limitations of IEAr Arguments and Conclusions  
a)  Extrapolation from the longer post 1990 trend is not robust  
As acknowledged by the IEAr study, the carbon intensity of GDP in Russia’s economy 
has not remained constant since 1990. In fact, it has followed an inverse U-shaped 
trajectory, increasing in the early 1990s, and decreasing steeply since 1998 (Figure 1). 
As argued in the study, longer periods are in general superior to shorter ones to perform 
extrapolations. But the Russian economy has been undergoing significant transformation 
and adjustments in the last 12 to 14 years, so that even the 1990 to 2003 period does not 
provide meaningful parameters. In fact, within this longer period, the Russian economy 
experienced two sub-periods: a massive crisis in 1990-1997 – with a corresponding rise 
in carbon intensity,—which is unlikely to be repeated in the future, and a GDP growth 
rebound in the 1998-2003 period—which was accompanied by a decline in carbon 
intensity,—and is arguably more consistent with the assumptions made by the study that 
GDP growth will remain high in the period 2003-2012. 
Figure 1: After an increase in the early 1990s, carbon intensity of GDP in Russia has decreased rapidly 



































Source: WDI, 2004 (GDP), Gov. of Russia (2002), IEA, 2003a, InRU, 2004 (CO2 emissions) 
It is correct that—as argued in the IEA study—part of the GDP growth over the 1998-
2003 period stems from favorable terms of trade. It is also unlikely, as noted in the study, 
that similar favorable movements in the terms of trade will occur again in the coming   7
decade. This could superficially lead to an argument that the carbon intensity of unit GDP 
is not going to decline as rapidly in the future as it has in the recent past. However, by the 
same reasoning, there is a high probability that GDP growth rates in the future will not be 
as high as in the recent past without another round of favorable terms of trade 
movements, especially if there is reliance on existing capacity in the energy sector. If 
capacity in the energy sector is expanded to facilitate high GDP growth rates, it will be 
with more modern technology, as a result of which the carbon intensity of GDP will drop 
(see 2.2.2). More detailed inter-industry analysis is required to determine the net 
consequences of different investment and growth rates.   
b)  The Comparators Used in the IEAr study are not Comparable 
The study argues that the relevant comparators for Russia are neither the rich countries in 
the industrial world today that show a strong decoupling between carbon emissions and 
GDP growth, nor the poorest countries at early stages of development where carbon 
emissions are growing sometimes faster than GDP. Instead, they argue that countries with 
similar per capita income levels and similar carbon intensities—the so-called “carbon 
intensive market economies below $16,000 per capita GDP (PPP terms)”—are the 
appropriate comparators, and they show that the trendline of changes in carbon intensity 
for this set of countries is relatively low. 
In fact, Russia stands out as an outlier in terms of carbon intensity to GDP even with 
respect to the members of this group (see taxonomy in the first table of the IEAr, 2004 
study). As indicated in Table 1 below, the carbon intensity of GDP in Russia is nearly 
twice as high as the average carbon intensity of the GDP in the other countries in this 
group (1.70 kgCO2/$ against 0.91 kgCO2/$, 2000 data, PPP terms using $1995, as per 
IEA, 2003a).   8
Table 1: Russia is an outlier with respect to the study’s own selected list of comparators: Russia’s carbon 
intensity of GDP is twice as high as the comparators’ average. 
Country  Carbon Intensity of GDP 
(kgCO2/$) 
Per capita GDP in PPP 
terms (2,000, using $1995) 
Algeria  0.38 5,000 
Venezuela  1.01 5,171 
Zimbabwe  0.44 2,372 
Jordan  0.8 3,597 
Iran  0.92 5,460 
South Korea  0.64 13,945 
Lebanon  0.84 3,866 
Libya  1.42 -- 
Oman  0.87 11,498 
Saudi Arabia  1.03 11,716 
Syria  1.09 3,067 
Trinidad and Tobago  1.36 8,232 
South Africa  0.69 8,702 
Jamaica  1.14 3,370 
Average of Russia’s 
Comparators 
0.91 2,372  –  13,945 
Russia  1.70 6,644 
Source: IEA, 2003a  
 
In addition, what is odd about this grouping is that the variation in per capita GDP is very 
high; from one half of that of Russia to double that. If we focus on countries with similar 
per capita incomes as Russia (+/- $1,000), then Russia stands out as an even larger 
outlier, by a factor of 4.  
Even if 10 to 15% of that difference can be accounted for by Russia’s larger size and 
colder climate, there is a substantial inefficiency built-in to the observed high carbon 
intensity in Russia. This suggests that Russia is well inside the production frontier of 
market economies, while the other countries in the group—which have been functioning 
as market or quasi-market economies for much longer than Russia—are closer to the 
production frontier of market economies. Consequently, the trendline observed for other 
countries in the group are not relevant for Russia.   9
c)  The carbon intensity trends of advanced economies at comparable stages of 
development as Russia are irrelevant  
The IEAr study draws from US and UK experience in the past century, which is totally 
meaningless given the amount of technological change since then and the availability of 
less carbon intensive technologies now. 
d)  There is no robust statistical relationship between GDP growth rates and carbon 
intensity growth rates, either across countries, or over time within countries 
As the study recognizes, there is no statistically robust relationship between GDP growth 
and carbon intensity growth across countries, or over time. As noted in Dudek et al. 
(2004), there is also limited correlation between GDP growth rates and carbon intensity 
growth rates within a country over time. The claim that countries experiencing high 
growth rates are likely to experience lower than average rates of decline in carbon 
intensity is thus not supported by the facts. 
e)  A General Limitation of the Econometric Approach: Future carbon intensity of 
GDP depends not only on structural variables, but also on policy decisions  
The arguments made by the authors of the IEAr study to justify a –2% rate of decline in 
carbon intensity of GDP share a fundamental weakness with many other similar analyses 
in that the relationship between carbon emissions and GDP is treated as if it were 
exclusively determined by structural variables (such as climate, natural resources 
endowments, technological structure, exogenous innovation, per capita GDP, etc.) and 
not susceptible to policy interventions.  Whereas in fact, policies will also have a strong 
impact on future carbon intensity of GDP. For example, the decision to increase, or not, 
domestic energy prices (for coal and gas) to reflect international price levels will have a 
strong influence on the carbon intensity in sectors of the economy that are sensitive to 
energy prices. Similarly, whether or not efforts are made to reduce existing inefficiencies 
in sectors that may not be currently sensitive to energy prices, such as in the production 
of electricity and heat (because of the prevalence of state-owned enterprises and weak 
budget constraints), will strongly affect the evolution of carbon intensity over the next 
decade. 
In a mature economy on its production frontier, the policy component influences trends 
gradually and has an effect only over the long term. But in an economy inside its 
production frontier, with substantial inefficiencies, the effect of policy is likely to be 
more rapid. Hence one should be able to observe changes in carbon intensity in the short 
run as well. As already noted above, Russia is in the second category of countries rather 
than in the first. 
Yet the IEAr study bases its statistical inferences on past emissions (which reflect both 
structural and policy decisions) without controlling for changes in policy variables. As a 
result, the capacity of the observed relationships to provide insights for next 10 years is 
doubtful.   10
2.2.2  Insights on Likely Trends in Carbon Intensity of GDP in Russia Using Less 
Aggregate Data 
a)  Carbon Intensity of GDP is Likely to Decline Faster than Assumed in the IEAr 
Study 
The discussion above casts doubt on the arguments put forward in the IEAr study to 
justify that carbon intensity of GDP will not decrease at a rate greater than -2% per year 
over the next decade. The discussion above does not, however, provide a positive 
argument as to how carbon intensity might evolve in the future. Part of that argument is 
provided below. 
The rate of variation of carbon intensity of GDP in Russia in the future probably lies 
somewhere between the –2% per annum trend postulated in the study and the –4.5% per 
annum trend experienced in the last five years based on actual data.  Where is difficult to 
say without more work. That requires a different type of analysis using a computable 
general equilibrium model which builds in opportunities to reduce technical inefficiencies 
and improve price responsiveness, amongst other features.  
As already pointed out, however, the structural inertia of the system is not as great as is 
implied in the IEAr study. There are three routes by which energy intensity of GDP can 
be reduced—all of which could have potentially significant impacts on Russia’s carbon 
intensity of GDP (based in part on experience in other countries):  
•  A declining role of energy intensive sectors. This is relevant for Russia since a shift 
from a natural resource/energy intensive sectors to services and other less carbon-
intensive activities has been observed over the past decade (according to the World 
Development Indicators, the share of industry in GDP has decreased from 48% to 35% 
in the period 1990 to 2003, while the share of services has risen from 35% to nearly 
60%
7). The comparison with China is instructive: in 1990, China and Russia had similar 
carbon intensities of GDP: 1.35 kgCO2/$ and 1.51 kgCO2/$ respectively (GDP in PPP, 
1995 dollars, as per IEA, 2003a). But in 2000, the carbon intensity of GDP in China 
was less than half of Russia’s (0.68 kgCO2/$ against 1.70 kgCO2/$). The decision to 
diversify China’s economy towards less energy-intensive manufacturing industry and 
services is central to that sharp divergence. 
•   An increase in the energy efficiency of energy-intensive activities. The Russian 
economy has one of the highest energy-intensities in the World, 2 times as high as in 
other transition economies, 2.3 times as high as in the U.S., 2.5 times as high as World 
average, and nearly 3.5 times as high as in the EU.
8 And there is agreement among 
experts that Russia has a huge potential for energy efficiency gains. Golub et al. (1999), 
for example, evaluate this potential at 1 btCO2(at negative or zero abatement cost) in 
Russia. Another example is the leakage of fugitive methane from pipelines (see 2.2.3 
below). The experience of other countries shows, as well, that programs to improve 
energy efficiency of energy-intensive industries can substantially reduce emissions per 
                                                 
7 WDI (using GDP at factor cost) 
8 Based on 2002 data from the  IEA Energy Balances for OECD and non-OECD countries, and the World 
Bank Development Indicators. GDP are expressed in PPP. Transition economies include Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.   11
unit of output. Japan, for example, adopted strong energy efficiency policies after the 
first oil shock, while South Korea did not. As a result, the energy-intensive industries in 
Japan became more productive. This is one of the reasons why carbon intensity, which 
was comparable to South Korea in 1971 (0.60 kgCO2/$ in Japan against 0.61 kgCO2/$ 
in Korea) is now half as high in Japan (0.36 kgCO2/$ against 0.65 kgCO2/$ in South 
Korea). 
•  A reduction in carbon emissions per unit of energy used through fuel switching. The 
experience of other countries suggests that the impact of these substitutions can be 
significant. For example, France had a carbon intensity one-third higher than Italy’s in 
1971 (0.65 kgCO2/$ against 0.48 kgCO2/$). In 2000, the carbon intensity of GDP in 
France was 20% lower than Italy’s (0.27 kgCO2/$ against 0.34  kgCO2/$), even as 
Italy’s carbon intensity of GDP declined. The faster decrease in France is, for the most 
part, due to the policy decision in France, after the first oil shock, to invest in a massive 
nuclear generation program. The potential of fuel-switching in Russia is more 
controversial. In the short run, Grubb et al. (2004) point out that Russia already has a 
carbon intensity of primary energy
9 close to that of the EU—58.4 tCO2/TJ in Russia 
against 51.3 tCO2/TJ in the EU15 in 2001 (IEA, 2003a)—because of high reliance on 
gas, and because of the presence of nuclear. Yet according to the IEA (2002), new 
generation capacity will have to be installed to meet Russia’s growing demand for 
electricity by 2010, or even earlier if GDP growth rates are higher than the 2.9% p.a. 
that the IEA study postulates.
10 The IEA estimates that this new capacity will be 90% 
gas. Such a substitution away from coal should lead to additional emission reductions.
11 
In transition economies where market forces are growing more rapidly than in Russia, a 
combination of these factors has led to a rapid reduction in carbon intensity (such as 
China, -50%, Poland, -41% or the Czech Republic, -26.1% between 1990 and 2001). In 
the future, similar improvements can be expected in Russia as, inter alia, (a) domestic 
prices of coal and gas move upwards, closer to international prices; and (b) as new 
capacity is installed, which relies on current technologies, which are more energy 
efficient than older technologies. 
b)  A Proxy Model for Determining the Likely Rate of Decline in Carbon Intensity of 
GDP  in a High-growth Scenario 
We have argued in the previous section that the arguments supporting a relatively rigid, 
high inertia energy economy with a –2% annual rate of decline in carbon intensity of 
GDP put forward by the IEAr (2004) study are not valid, and that there are good reasons 
to believe that the relationship between GDP and CO2 emissions is less rigid – even over 
the next eight to ten years depending on the set of public policies that is adopted. 
To project CO2 emissions in the future, the question is then as follows: will policies that 
tend to reduce carbon intensity of GDP be adopted? As noted by Mirrless-Black et al. 
(2004), some of these policies, such as liberalization of domestic energy prices, or 
                                                 
9 The amount of CO2 emissions per unit of primary energy consumed. 
10 We will see below that 2.9% is in the lower end of the range of GDP growth projections for Russia in the 
coming decade. 
11 In the IEA (2003b) scenario, the share of coal in installed capacity decreases from 20% in 2000 to 15% 
in 2020, while the share of gas increases from 42% to 57% over the same period.   12
facilitation of domestic or foreign investment, are also prerequisites for higher growth. In 
other words, if one assumes a high GDP growth rate for Russia over the next decade, one 
must also assume for consistency that these policies will be adopted. 
In the absence of a detailed model of the Russian energy sector and of the Russian 
economy, a qualitative way to analyze how the rate of variation in carbon intensity of 
GDP might vary with the rate of growth of per capita GDP is to use the IEA (2002) 
investment scenario mentioned earlier. Under this scenario, growth is sufficiently slow in 
the period 2001 to 2010 (2.9% p.a.), that the bulk of the growth in electricity demand can 
be met by existing power generation capacity. Beyond 2010, however, that capacity will 
be exhausted, and new power generation capacity will have to be installed, mostly gas.  
Carbon intensity of GDP diminishes by only 0.8% p.a. for the first ten years, but then by 
2.1% p.a. in the second decade as a large amount of new capital is invested and new 
capacity installed.  In this scenario the economy almost doubles in 20 years (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Assumptions of the IEA (2002) scenario for Russia 
  2000 2010  2020 
GDP (b$ 1995)  428.5 570.3  804.5 
CO2 Emissions 
(MtCO2 p.a.) 
1,492 1,829  2,068 
Carbon Intensity of 
GDP (kgCO2/$) 
3.48 3.20  2.57 
Coal in Electricity 
Mix (TWh) 
176 213  213 
Oil in Electricity Mix 
(TWh) 
33 33  27 
Gas in Electricity 
Mix (TWh) 
370 472  803 
Others in Electricity 
Mix (TWh) 
298 334  358 
 
If the target of doubling GDP in 10 years put forth by Mr. Putin and included as the high 
case in the IEAr study is assumed (7.2% economic growth p.a.), that is equivalent to 
compressing the IEA economic growth projection into a 9-year period instead of a 20-
year period. But such accelerated growth in GDP will have to be accompanied by 
accelerated growth in electricity demand, exhausting existing capacity and requiring new 
investment, so it can be assumed that the evolution of the energy system described in the 
IEA (2002) scenario would also take place in 9 years instead of in 20 years. As a result, 
the carbon intensity of GDP would decline from 3.48 to 2.57 in 9 years, at an average of 
-3.3%/rate p.a.    13
2.2.3  Is the Kyoto Target Binding or Will There be a Surplus of Allowances? 
a)  The Share of Non-CO2 Gases Emissions will not Increase 
Non-CO2 GHG emissions have been declining at an even more rapid rate than CO2 
emissions during the past decade. In 1990, non-CO2 emissions amounted to 22.6% of 
total GHG emissions. In 1999, this share had decreased to 19.6% (Gov. of Russia, 2002). 
As of 1999, fugitive methane emissions from leaks in gas pipelines still accounted for the 
majority of non-CO2 emissions (54%). Yet they have diminished substantially since 
1990, and a program adopted by Gazprom aims at reducing them by a further half 
between 2000 and 2012 (UNFCCC, 2004, pp.16-17). 
Thus, it is likely that the share of non-CO2 emissions will continue to diminish through 
2012.  However, a conservative assumption is to assume that this share will remain 
constant from 1999 to 2012. 
 











































































Source: Gov. of Russia, 2002 and InRU, 2004 for emissions, World Bank Development Indicators, 2004 
for GDP. 
b)  Combined GHG Emissions Projections 
Based on the discussion in 2.2.2, is it likely that (i) the carbon intensity of GDP will be a 
function of the rate of growth of GDP growth, and that (ii) carbon intensity will decrease 
a rate largely below than -2% p.a. for high GDP growth rates (around 6-7% p.a.). In 
Table 3 below, we assume two scenarios for the carbon intensity of GDP, namely that it 
decreases either by -2% p.a. or by -4% p.a. And we assume two scenarios for GDP 
growth rates: namely 7.2% p.a. and 4% p.a. (as in Mirrless-Black et al., 2004). We still   14
leave the combination (-2%, 7.2%), although it is not likely given the discussion above. 
Similarly, the combination (-4%, 4%) is also unlikely. 
 
Table 3: Annual average GHG Emissions (in MtCO2e) and total surplus of emissions allowances over 
the period 2008-2012 under two GDP Growth Rates assumptions, and two carbon intensity decrease rates 
assumptions—assuming that the share of non-CO2 gases in total GHG emissions remains constant between 
1999 and 2012  
   Rate of Decline of Carbon Intensity in GDP 
    -2% -4% 























4%  2,271 (3,884)  1,976 (5,360) 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Table 3 shows that even under the most conservative set of assumptions—a 7.2% GDP 
growth rate from 2003 to 2012, a slow rate of decrease of carbon intensity of GDP (-2% 
p.a.), and a non-declining share of non-CO2 gases in total emissions—average GHG 
emissions over the period 2008-2012 are below the 1990 level (2,825 MtCO2e against 
3,048 MtCO2e).
12 In other words, even in this very conservative case, the Kyoto Protocol 
does not constrain Russia’s emissions or GDP growth rate. In fact, even in this set of 
assumptions, Russia has a net surplus of emissions allowances of 1,115 MtCO2e over the 
commitment period.
13 Table 3 also shows that for less conservative assumptions about 
GDP growth rate and rate of decline of carbon intensity in GDP, the annual average 
emissions between 2008 and 2012 is lower, and the total amount of surplus allowances is 
higher. 
                                                 
12 In most cases, projected GHG emissions never exceed 1990 levels from 2008 to 2012. It is only for a 
growth rate of 7.2% per year and a carbon intensity of GDP decreasing at only -2% p.a.  that GHG 
emissions exceed 1990 levels in 2012. But even in that case, on average, GHG emissions between 2008 and 
2012 remain below the Kyoto target. 
13 This result differs from IEAr (2004) for three reasons. 
•  First, the IEAr study assumes that CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel are 1,633 MtCO2 in 2003. 
However, it is not clear where this figure comes from. 2004 emissions data from the Energy 
Institute of the Russian Academy of Science suggests that 2003 emissions were in fact 1589 
MtCO2, or 44 MtCO2 less. Although the Energy Institute data is not official emissions data, it is 
fully consistent with official emissions data for the period they overlap 
•  Second, IEAr (2004) uses data from IEA (2003a) for 1990 CO2 emissions. However, the proper 
1990 CO2 emissions level that should be used to set the target is the one given in Russia’s Third 
National Communication to the UNFCCC (2,360 MtCO2), and not the level reported by the 
International Energy Agency that is used in the study (,2023 MtCO2, as per IEA, 2003a, sectoral 
approach). The reason is that the former is based on the IPCC methodology, while the latter is not 
(IEA, 2003a, pp.xliv-xlv); and that inventories to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol must 
follow IPCC guidelines. 
•  Third, IEAr (2004) does not account for the fact that the share of non-CO2 gases in Russia’s GHG 
emissions has decreased significantly from 1990 to 1999.   15
2.2.4  Can Emissions Related to Land Use, Land-Use Change or Forestry Offset the 
Surplus of Allowances? 
a)  Emissions from land-use changes under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol are 
Unlikely to Offset Net Surplus of Allowances 
Under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia must account for the carbon uptakes and 
releases from the areas which have been afforested, reforested or deforested since 1990. 
Russia would thus only be liable for significant emissions from land-use change under 
the Protocol if it were to practice large-scale deforestation, which is not the case at 
present. In fact, the carbon stock and area of Russia’s forest has been growing in the past 
decades (Schvidenko and Nilsson, 2002). 
In addition, once an area is registered under Article 3.3 (because it is either afforested, 
reforested or deforested), the amount of carbon stocked on this area continues to be 
monitored.  Thus, if there is a forest fire in plantations established since 1990, the stored 
carbon would be lost, and there would be a debit under Article 3.3. However, the areas 
where new plantations are established are relatively small, with limited carbon stock per 
hectare, as the trees are still young. In addition, these plantations are managed to reduce 
the risk of forest fires. As a result, regeneration in the forests which are expanding will 
likely more than offset losses due to forest fires. 
b)  The surplus of allowances could increase from provisions of Article 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, but not necessarily 
Under Article 3.4 of the Protocol, Russia has the option (but not the obligation) to 
designate standing forests under “forest management” and account for changes in their 
stock of carbon. There is an incentive for Russia to do so because—under the Marrakech 
Accords—it can claim up to 120 MtCO2e under this option. And Russia has more than 
enough forest to meet this requirement since its forests, overall, are currently storing 
carbon at a rate of about 800 MtCO2e per year. 
Some analysts (e.g., Dudek et al., 2004) have presented these 120 MtCO2e as an 
additional emissions budget for Russia, on the implicit assumption that designating 
forests under forest management bears little or no costs. However, by electing to claim 
for forest management, Russia would also become exposed to the risk of losses from fires 
in the forests it designates. The carbon content per hectare of forests managed under 
Article 3.4 might be higher than that of the plantations covered under Article 3.3, because 
forests under management under Article 3.4 are likely to be older. In addition, whereas 
plantations are managed to reduce the risk of fires, non-plantation forests in Russia are 
poorly protected against this risk. In fact, forest fires are currently responsible for 
emissions between 150 to 300 MtCO2e per year. This risk could arguably increase over 
time as global warming is accompanied by drier conditions, unless policies are put in 
place to dramatically improve monitoring and rapid response to forest fires, as in Brazil, 
and contrary to Indonesia (World Bank, 2001). 
In summary, the claim that Russia could simply add, up to 120 MtCO2e, to its Kyoto 
target at no costs because of Article 3.4 is incorrect. The options opened up by Article 3.4 
are potentially of genuine interest to Russia, but the costs and benefits of using them need 
to be assessed more carefully. Then again, this is a decision that is totally separate from   16
the ratification decision. Neither Russia, nor any other Annex I country for that matter, is 
obliged to make it now. 
2.3  Will There be an Indirect Impact on GDP Through International Energy 
Markets and the Terms of Trade? 
The previous section has demonstrated that even under very conservative assumptions 
regarding the evolution of carbon intensity of GDP, and very high assumptions regarding 
economic growth rates, the Kyoto target would not be binding, and thus would not 
directly constrain economic growth in Russia. 
Yet growth in Russia could be indirectly affected by changes that Kyoto might induce in 
international markets—such as oil and gas markets—and thus through changes in the 
terms of trade. This is of special importance to Russia since it is a major exporter of oil 
and gas, and revenues from these exports amount to 6.2% of GDP. 
The logic is as follows. In Annex I countries (without the U.S. and Australia), the Kyoto 
Protocol is likely to induce conservation efforts as well as shifts towards less carbon-
intensive energy sources (from coal to gas and from gas to renewables). The net effect of 
this adjustment is likely to be a lower demand for oil, and maybe for gas. As a result, 
international prices of oil, and possibly gas, might decline slightly. 
There has been surprisingly little research on the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on 
international energy markets since the decision of the U.S. to withdraw from the Protocol. 
Most of the figures available in the literature thus relate to a scenario in which the U.S. 
participates, thus overestimating the real impacts of the Protocol. For example, Holtsmark 
and Maestad (2001) estimate that the international price of oil in 2010 would be reduced 
by 2% relative to what it would be otherwise, and that the international price of gas in 
Europe would be reduced by 4% compared to what would have happened otherwise with 
U.S. participation. It is likely that the figures would be lower without the U.S., since the 
global constraint on emissions is then much lower. 
Holtsmark (2003) argues that without the U.S. the Kyoto Protocol results in a maximum 
–0.75% decrease in the international price of gas and a maximum –1.0% decrease in the 
price of oil. Holtsmark also points out that the impact of Kyoto on the international 
energy markets are not independent of the amount of carbon that Russia sells. In fact, the 
domestic mitigation efforts in Europe, Japan, New Zealand and Canada depends on the 
amount of allowances Russia sells. The domestic constraint on Europe, Japan, New 
Zealand and Canada can even go down to zero if Russia sells a sufficient amount of 
allowances (see details in section 3 below). Yet selling large amount of allowances also 
depresses the price of allowances, and thus reduces the net proceeds from the sale. As a 
result, there is a trade-off between selling more credits and reducing the impact of Kyoto 
on the energy markets at the expense of the price of carbon itself, and selling fewer 
allowances to maximize the benefits from the sale of allowances, but at the expense of 
lower revenues from oil and gas exports. Hotlsmark (2003) suggests that Russia’s 
optimal strategy is probably to sell more rather than less. 
Leaving this trade-off aside, and assuming the worst impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on 
energy markets mentioned above, what would be the impacts on Russian growth?  The 
impact would be twofold. First, reduced proceeds from the international sale of oil and   17
gas (as assumed by Holtsmark, 2003) would effect the trade balance and therefore GDP. 
Second, reduced exports could reduce domestic investment capacity, and therefore limit 
growth. Estimates of the sensitivity of GDP growth to oil prices reported in Mirrless-
Black et al. (2004) range from 0.07% to 0.08% decrease in GDP growth per percent 
increase in international oil prices. According to these figures, the 1% decrease in oil 
prices noted above would reduce Russia’s GDP growth rate by less than 0.1%. A more 
detailed macroeconomic model of the Russian economy, however, would be necessary to 
produce a more accurate number. 
3  Potential Benefits to Russia Associated with Ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
3.1  Can Ratification Benefit the Russian Economy? 
So far, this paper has focused on the potential costs of the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by Russia in terms of potential growth foregone, and it has concluded there are 
none even in worst case scenarios.  However, Russia can also benefit from the Kyoto 
Protocol in two ways: 
•  First, as discussed in section 2, Russia GHG emissions in 2008-2012 are very 
likely to be below the Kyoto target. Russia can either sell these AAUs at no cost 
to its economy, or bank them for future commitment periods. 
•  Second, many believe that the Russian economy has a large supply of low-cost 
mitigation options. As long as domestic mitigation costs are lower than the 
international price of emission allowances, Russia can exercise these options, and 
either sell further AAUs than the excess ones under international emissions 
trading, or sell Emission Reduction Units under Joint Implementation (Article 6 
of the Kyoto Protocol) for a profit. 
To evaluate the potential benefits associated with each option, it is necessary to evaluate 
the potential supply and demand for AAUs on the international market, as well as the 
potential price for AAUs (sub-section 3.2). On this basis,  subsection 3.3 discusses the 
potential benefits of the sale of “excess” AAUs, and subsection 3.4 the sale of emission 
reductions beyond the excess AAUs, via either JI or emissions trading. 
3.2  What Might the Carbon Market for AAUs Look Like in 2008-2012? 
3.2.1  A Two Stage Process for Determining the Volume of AAU Sales  
The combined emissions of the EU, Canada, Japan, and other industrialized countries 
members of Annex I are expected to exceed their combined Kyoto targets by 5,000 to 
5,500 MtCO2e during the first commitment period, given their current emissions levels, 
and assuming business-as-usual emissions growth over the next decade.
14  To meet this 
potential shortfall, these countries can either implement more policies and measures to 
reduce domestic emissions, or they can purchase credits through CDM and JI projects, or 
                                                 
14 Based on emissions data (all gases) from 2001 on UNFCCC website. Emissions growth rate from 2001 
to 2010 extracted from IEA (2003b) and U.S. DoE (2003).   18
through international trading of allowances. Russia could be a suppler in the latter two 
cases. 
Most of the models of the carbon market to date assume that countries decide to allocate 
their resources all at once, and that the markets for JI, the CDM and AAUs all clear 
simultaneously. In reality though, these markets are likely to be solved sequentially. The 
reason is that project-based transactions, such as JI or the CDM, involve substantial lead 
times between the moment the project is prepared, and the moment it actually starts 
operating and “yielding” its first emission reductions—typically 5 to 7 years for energy 
projects. As a result, the window of opportunity for starting projects that will generate 
emission reductions by 2012 is actually closing rapidly. 
The same can be said about domestic policies and measures. The time lag between the 
conception and the enactment of a law can be several years. And the benefits of the law 
in terms of reduced emissions might also be felt only in a gradual way, especially since 
OECD governments have only indirect control over major sources of domestic emissions, 
such as transportation, industry or even energy. As a result, we depart from the 
assumption that the inter-linked carbon markets will clear simultaneously.  More likely, 
governments will first make their choices about domestic policies and purchases of JI and 
CDM allowances. Then the remaining supply and demand is cleared on the spot AAU 
allowance market. 
3.2.2  Potential Demand for AAUs (Net of Domestic Policies, Supply of JI and the 
CDM) 
It is difficult to estimate how much can and will be done domestically by Europe, 
Canada, Japan and New Zealand beyond what is already included in the projections 
mentioned above. A review of models by Haites (2004) shows a net demand for AAUs 
between 3,000 and 5,500 MtCO2e. Domestic projections included in National 
Communications to the UNFCCC yield a combined shortfall of 2.5 btCO2e. Presumably, 
this low figure stems from the fact that national communications include more domestic 
policies and measures than other models. We choose this figure as a conservative low 
estimate of the potential demand for emission reductions by Annex B countries—
domestic policies and measures included. 
Since the CDM is expected to supply between 300 and 500 MtCO2e (Haites, 2004), the 
potential total demand for AAUs from Russia and other economies in transition could be 
around 2,000 to 2,500 MtCO2e. 
3.2.3  Potential Supply of AAUs 
Table 3 indicates that Russia’s total amount of excess AAUs might be between 1,115 and 
5,360 MtCO2e over 2008-2012. But as argued in section 2 the two extreme boundaries (in 
shaded grey in Table 3) have much lower probability. Realistically, Russia’s total amount 
of excess AAUs might thus be between 2,900 and 3,900 MtCO2e. 
In addition, Ukraine and all other transition economies could have between 2,500 and 
3,500 MtCO2e for sale. In other words, Russia might represent a little more than half of 
total supply of excess AAUs, with Ukraine accounting for about one fourth, and all other 
transition economies the remaining fourth.   19
Thus, there is a large imbalance between potential supply and potential demand of AAUs, 
especially if we assume that OECD countries meet half of the gap between their business-
as-usual emissions and their Kyoto targets through domestic policy reforms and 
measures. In this case, the supply of excess allowances could be between two and three 
times as large as demand. 
This means that Russia will not be able to sell all its excess allowances. Keeping some 
AAUs, however, has advantages for Russia, and should certainly be part of its portfolio. 
First, the Kyoto Protocol allows for keeping AAUs for use in future commitment periods 
(banking). This provides value even to the allowances that are not sold.  In addition, this 
reserve could act as an insurance against any risk, however remote, that Russia’s 
emissions might overshoot its target. 
How much Russia is able to sell will depend on the competition from Ukraine and other 
transition economies, as well as on the preferences of buyer countries. Although Ukraine 
and other transition economies could in theory supply all the 2,500 MtCO2e required by 
countries in need of allowances, this scenario has a low probability of occurrence for 
several reasons. First, it would require Ukraine and other transition economies to keep 
very low or zero buffers against unexpected high GDP growth rates in their own 
countries. Second, it would mean that Ukraine is able to attract large-scale investments, 
which is not the case at the moment. Third, it would mean that OECD countries are 
bypassing Russia, the largest economy in the region, which also seems rather unlikely. 
For these reasons it is more likely that Russia could sell about 1,000 MtCO2e on the 
international market. This amount is less than Russia’s share in the Protocol, but it is 
consistent with results of modeling exercises compiled by Haites (2004), in which Russia 
never sees less than 1,250 MtCO2e over the first commitment period. 
3.2.4  Potential Price for AAUs 
Current prices of certified emission reductions under the CDM are between $3 and $6 per 
tCO2e. Prices on the emerging allowance markets are higher (around €8-9/tCO2e per 
tCO2e for EU allowances as of October 2004). 
It is difficult to predict prices of allowances during the first commitment period. In a 
purely competitive market, excess supply should lead to a price of zero. However, as 
noted above, Russia and to a lesser degree Ukraine have strong market power and do not 
need to sell all their allowances. Prices are all the more difficult to predict given that 
AAU purchases are likely be part of larger arrangements that might involve, for example, 
oil and gas exports from Russia, as well as investments in the energy sector. 
Willingness to pay by buyers is also difficult to evaluate. Surveys reveal that most market 
players are anticipating a price of allowances around $10/tCO2e during the first 
commitment period. This is consistent with current prices of European allowances, as 
well as with what governments are currently willing to pay for JI or CDM transactions 
(nominal prices per tonne are lower under these two mechanisms because risks are higher 
than with AAU allowance purchases). Yet absent any other data, the projections below 
are based on a conservative price of $6/tCO2e, the higher range of current prices for 
certified emission reductions.   20
3.3  Potential Barriers to Sale of Excess Allowances can be Overcome by 
“Greening” of the Allowances 
Under the price and quantity assumptions outlined above, Russia could conservatively 
expect at least $6 billion in direct revenues from the sale of excess AAUs over the period 
2008-2012. However, realizing this potential might face significant barriers as some 
OECD Parties have expressed reluctance to buy excess AAUs or “hot air”. 
From a legal point of view, there is no distinction between “excess” allowances—that is 
allowances beyond the country’s baseline emissions— and “normal” allowances. In fact, 
it is very difficult to distinguish between them ex ante, because trading will take place 
before the emissions are measured (emissions inventories are typically available with a 1 
to 2 years delay), and thus, before one really knows whether AAUs are “normal” or “in 
excess”. 
Yet from a political economy point of view, buying what has been dubbed as “paper 
tonnes” might not be palatable to the public opinions in a number of countries. As a 
result, major stakeholders, governments and firms are under pressure not to purchase “hot 
air” (Koch and Michaelowa, 1999). But too high a price for carbon is equally 
unacceptable to governments and firms, thus foreclosing the possibility to tap into the 
“hot air” reserve is also a difficult decision to make. 
Hence the idea of “greening” AAUs, that is to somehow tie part of the revenues from the 
sale of “excess” AAUs to activities beneficial to the environment. By ensuring the 
environmental integrity of the AAUs, greening enables AAU buyers to be politically 
correct, and increases demand for AAU sellers. In fact, the government of Canada and 
some EU member countries have announced that they do not intend to purchase “hot air” 
unless it is somehow “greened.”
15 
Greening links the sale of AAUs with an underlying project or set of projects. As a result, 
the project is likely to become more attractive because it has another product to sell 
(namely AAUs), thus increasing its internal rate of return. In addition, the AAU purchase 
contract might have high value for financing institutions because it is denominated in 
strong currency (e.g., euros or dollars), and consists of buyers with strong credit ratings 
(most probably sovereigns). Lastly, if AAU delivery and payment is somehow tied to 
project performance, this builds confidence in the other investors that the project is 
sound. 
To maximize this leverage effect, Russia could for example create an “AAU Fund”. The 
fund would pool money from private and public entities to buy AAUs. This would attract 
capital for financing the underlying projects. This money—which could be supported by 
bilaterals and multilaterals, for example in the form of partial risk guarantees—would 
                                                 
15 Canada Climate Change Plan (2002) states that “One issue that has received considerable attention is the 
possibility of buying surplus permits from Russia and eastern European countries, where economic decline 
over the past decade has lowered their emissions below their Kyoto target. The Government of Canada has 
already indicated that it would buy such permits only if the selling country agrees to invest the proceeds 
from the sale in projects and activities that contribute to emissions reductions. This is called ‘greening’ 
surplus permits and ensures that these purchases result in real environmental benefits that contribute to 
addressing climate change.” (p.43)   21
then fund projects in the energy sector in Russia. As the projects perform, AAUs would 
be delivered against payments. 
It is expected that such a fund could attract about 3 times, and possibly as high as 5 times, 
as much capital as the amount required for AAU purchases. The total amount of capital 
that could be leveraged could thus be, conservatively, on the order of $24b to $36b 
during the five years of the first commitment period. This is not an insignificant amount.  
The IEA (2003b) estimates that Russia will need about $17b of investment in the energy 
sector annually over the period 2001-2010 to tap its vast oil and gas resources, fuel its 
economic growth, and serve foreign markets. Likewise, huge investments are needed to 
maintain and extend the transportation infrastructure, as well as provide housing. Yet 
gross domestic fixed capital formation is not sufficient to meet the large investment 
demand and net annual inflows of Foreign Direct Investment have been a meager $2b to 
$3.5b in recent years.   
3.4  Joint Implementation and the Sale of AAUs Beyond “Excess” Allowances  
In addition to selling “excess” AAUs—at no economic cost to the Russian economy—
Russia may also be able to sell Emission Reduction Units under Joint Implementation.  In 
practice, the discussion in section 3.2.3 suggests that it is unlikely that the demand for 
AAUs will be high enough to justify Russia using this option. 
However, there may well be joint implementation opportunities in the country, that could 
substitute for the sale of AAUs. Using JI might be beneficial for Russia because the costs 
of reducing emissions for the JI project should be lower than the price paid for the 
emission reductions, and because this saves more allowances to be banked for future 
periods. However, it is unlikely that the number of JI projects will be very large because 
of the time-lag constraint that also affects the CDM. 
4  Impacts Beyond 2012 
4.1  Does the Kyoto Protocol Entail Any Cost to Russia Beyond 2012? 
In several instances throughout the IEAr (2004) study, it is implied that by ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol, Russia (i) also accepts targets beyond the first commitment period, and 
(ii) that these targets are likely to impose severe restrictions on the country’s emissions 
and growth. 
Both statements are wrong. The Kyoto Protocol has no provision for allocating quotas 
beyond 2012; nor does it obligate Russia in any way vis-à-vis the international climate 
regimes that might come beyond Kyoto. In other words, Russia does not take on any 
commitment beyond 2012 by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  
Moreover, the international climate regime beyond 2012 will be negotiated by the Parties 
to the UNFCCC, which include Russia. Russia will thus have its say in the negotiations, 
and will have, as any other Party, the right to accept or reject the compromise that comes 
out of these negotiations.   22
However, independently of Kyoto, Russia as a member of the community of Nations will 
have to participate in finding ways to effectively and fairly deal with global warming as a 
global public good. 
4.2  Kyoto Ratification and Long-Term Climate Change 
The argument has been made that Russia might be a net beneficiary of climate change, at 
least if climate change remains within reasonable margins. As a result, it might be in the 
national interest of Russia to, in fact, limit action on climate change. 
Unfortunately, given the current state of knowledge about the potential impacts of 
climate change, it is not clear that Russia belongs to the camp of the “winners” of climate 
change. In fact, there is sufficient uncertainty on the scale and direction of different 
impacts that it would be a big risk to assume that, net, Russia could be better off. 
In northern zones, some estimates indicate that agricultural productivity could increase as 
a result of warmer, longer growing seasons. But the extensive agricultural regions of 
southern Russia are largely semi-arid zones. These are expected to experience increased 
drying, especially during the growing season. Even if agriculture in Russia overall could 
benefit, there could still be a large number of losers. 
These estimates for agriculture are also based only on an increase in average mean 
temperature. But as Russia experiences disproportionately large warming in comparison 
to the rest of the world (Houghton et al., 2001), the hydrologic cycle is likely to intensify, 
causing more intense rainstorms, snowstorms and more flooding, requiring massive 
physical investment to protect against these hazards.
16 
In other sectors, climate change might also cause severe damages. In the transport and 
energy sectors for example, melting of permafrost in the Arctic will damage much of the 
buildings, transport infrastructure, and installations for oil and gas extraction, that are 
built on top of permafrost (e.g., Anisimov, 1997). In addition, Russia has a gigantic 
coastline. As sea level rises, coastal areas will suffer from increased storm damages and 
flooding, again requiring massive physical investment just to protect existing 
infrastructure and maintain existing levels of welfare, at the expense of developing new 
infrastructure and improving welfare. 
Lastly, neither Russia—nor any other country for that matter—can consider only the 
climate change damages that affect its own territory. In the regions hit hardest, climate 
change might indeed trigger international spillovers such as changes in international 
markets, migrations, or conflicts over scarce resources (e.g., water). Should warming 
significantly degrade livelihoods south of the Russian border (e.g. in North-East China, 
Mongolia, or the Republics of Central Asia), it is possible that migratory pressure on the 
large and relatively low-density territory of Russia could increase significantly. 
                                                 
16 These hazards exclude ecosystem and biodiversity damages which also could be quite serious. Climate 
change may result in extinction of certain animal and plant species. As rates of warming increase, it is 
likely that many species will be trapped, because the change will be too fast, and there will be too many 
human obstacles in their path to allow these species to move to more suitable locations and adapt 
successfully to the changing climate. And some arctic species such as polar bears, reindeer, and Arctic 
foxes may have nowhere to go at all.   23
The discussion above does not attempt to exhaust the subject, but to highlight the 
uncertainty intrinsic to the evaluation of the impacts of climate change. As a result, there 
is currently no certainty that Russia could benefit, overall, from climate change. 
5 Conclusion 
This review of the potential consequences of ratification for Russia concludes that—
contrary to the implication in the IEAr (2004) study—it is highly unlikely that ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol will reduce economic growth in Russia, either directly by curtailing 
its GHG emissions, or indirectly through international energy markets. On the other hand, 
ratification is likely to benefit Russia by allowing for the sale of some AAUs, and 
associated investments especially if “green investment schemes” are set up. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the amount of allowances that Russia might be able to 
sell, the paper adopts a very conservative approach in estimating the benefit of 
allowances.  More precise estimates and projections on the consequences of complying 
with the Kyoto Protocol will require a detailed general equilibrium model of the Russian 
economy to analyze the GDP – Energy – CO2
 emissions nexus, and its sensitivity to 
policy reforms.   24
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